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Fixed Costs and Labor Supply
ABSTRACT
Thisstudy is a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of
time and money costs of labor market participation on married women's supply
behavior. The existence of fixed costs implies that individuals are not
willing to work less than some minimum number of hours, termed reservation
hours. 'The theoretical analysis of the properties of the reservation hours.
function are derived. The empirical analysis develops and estimates labor
supply functions when fixed costs are present, but cannot be observed in
the data. The likelihood function developed to estimate the model is an
extension of the statistical model of Heckman (1974) that allows the minimum
number of hours supplied to be nonzero and differ randomly among individuals.
The empirical results indicate that fixed costs of work are of prime importance
in determining the labor supply behavior of married women. At the sample
means, the minimum number of hours a woman is willing to work is about 1300
per year. The estimated fixed costs an average woman incurs upon entry into
the labor market is $920 in 1966 dollars. This represents 28 percent of her
yearly earnings. Finally, labor supply parameters estimated with the fixed
cost model are compared to those estimated under the conventional assumption
of no fixed costs. Large differences in estimated paramters are found, suggesting
that the conventional model is seriously inisspecified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last seven years, labor economists have produced a considerable
volume of research on the determinants of married women's labor supply
behavior. During this period, several substantive methodological and
empirical advancements have been made. Perhaps these advancements are best
characterized by the work of Gronau (1973, 1975) on the "selectivity bias"
in wage equations, Heckman (1974) on the estimation of wage, labor force
participation, and labor supply functions, Hanoch (1976) on the theoretical
foundations for empirical integration of alternative measures of labor
supply, and Heckman (1974), Smith (1974), Heckman and Willis (1977), and MaCurdy
(1980), on life—cycle models of labor supply behavior. Although these studies
have greatly enhanced our knowledge of the role that economic and demographic
factors play in shaping married women's labor market behavior, much remains
to be done. There are several key issues that have been entirely neglected
or treated only on a superficial level. One such issue is the impact of
time and money costs of labor market entry on labor supply behavior. In
empirical work, little if any systematic attempt to incorporate such costs
into econometric models of labor supply behavior has as yet been undertaken.
Most often, the existence of these costs is assumed away. This lack of
empirical work stems primarily from two difficulties. First, data on
actual amounts of time and/or money costs incurred upon entry into the
labor market are at best scant and incomplete. Furthermore, even if entry
costs could be obtained for participants in the labor force, such data are
inherently not observable for nonparticipants. Second, the existence of2
fixed entry costs imparts a discontinuity in the individual's labor supply
function. This discontinuity reflects the fact that with costs of labor
market participation, individuals will not choose to work below some minimum
number of hours. This minimum, or reservation hours, is not observable in
the data and presumably differs among individuals.
In this paper, a simple model to illustrate labor supply effects of
time and money costs of labor market entry is presented and a statistical
procedure for estimating labor supply functions when these costs are not
directly observable in the data is developed. Although the analysis is
confined to married women's labor supply, the approach taken is quite
general and may be applied, for example, to the estimation of demand func-
tions for goods sold under fixed—fee plus marginal price arrangements.
Section II is devoted to a theoretical analysis of the effects of costs
of labor market entry on labor supply behavior. In Section III the statis-
tical model and estimation procedures are discussed. The model relies on
two behavioral functions: an hours of work function and a reservation hours
function. The hours of work function is a garden variety labor supply func-
tion. The reservation hours function indicates the minimum number of hours
an individual is willing to supply to the market. With costs of labor
market entry, these two functions characterize the supply side of the market.
A market demand or wage function is added to complete the model. A maximum
likelihood estimator is proposed to estimate the parameters of these equa-
tions. This estimator extends the statistical model of Heckman (1974) by allow-
ing for entry hours to be nonzero and to differ randomly among individuals,
Section IV presents the empirical results. These results indicate that entry
costs are of prime importance in determining the labor supply behavior of
married women. The estimated size of the discontinuity in the supply function3
is large——around 1,000 hours per year at the sample means. Again at the
sample means, the estimated annual cost of labor force participation is
approximately $920 in 1966 dollars, which amounts to about 28% of the
average yearly earnings of working women in the sample. Also, labor supply
parameter estimates of the entry cost model are compared with those obtained
under the assumption of zero cost of participation. These comparisons reveal
large differences between estimated parameters and suggest that the






II. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Most of the important implications of cost to labor market entry are
easily summarized by the familiar income—leisure and corresponding labor
supply diagram:
Figure 1
In Figure 1(a) Y and H are the individual's endowment of nonwage income and
time, respectively. The variables M and T denote the level of money and time
lost upon entry into the labor market. The reservation wage, the minimum wage
offer just necessary to induce the individual to work, is depicted as WR. As
Figure 1 illustrates, an implication of fixed working cost is that individuals
will not be willing to work below some minimum number of hours, termed reser-







HOURS OF WORK (h)5
described by the discontinuity of the labor supply function at the reservation
wage in Figure 1(b). The size of the discontinuity depends on the individual's
preference function as well as the levels of Y, '1, and
A second immediate consequence of fixed cost of labor market entry is that
their existence severs the identity between the reservation wage and the shadow
price (value) nonworkers assign to their time. The value a nonworker assigns
to his or her time is given in Figure 1(a) by the slope of the indifference
curve at E*. Previous attempts to estimate nonworkers' values of time have
relied on its equality with the reservation wage. Two approaches have been
used. One is to use labor force participation data (Gronau, 1973, 1974). The
other is to use the height of an estimated labor supply function at zero hours
of work (Heckman, 1974). As Figure 1(a) suggests, the former approach, which
correctly estimates reservation wages, will tend to overestimate values non—
workers assign to their time. The latter approach, which estimates the slope
of the indifference curve net of the time and money cost (pt E in Figure 1(a)),
will underestimate the value of time at zero hours of work if only money costs
of entry exist, and overestimate this value if only time costs exist.
The effects of variations in fixed costs on hours of work among workers
are obvious and can be stated without derivation. Increases in money cost of
entry act as reductions in money wealth and, if leisure is a normal good, will
increase hours of work among workers. Increases in the time cost of working,
on the other hand, will reduce hours of work among workers.2
The effects of money and time costs of entry on the minimum number of
hours the individual is willing to work are less obvious, but easily estab-
lished by using the individual's expenditure function. The expenditure
'The properties of the reservationwage function are derived later in
this section.
2Strictly speaking, these results follow only if leisure is a normal good
in the case of money costs and the composite commodity (income) is a normal
good in the case of time costs.6
function is written as
(1) Y=G(w,U) + N —W(H—
where(Y/W) EC1equals the equilibrium quantity of leisure demand and
(BY/RU)G2 is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income. Furthermore,
(2G/W2)G11 is the Hicks—Slutsky substitution effect of a risejn the
wage rate on the quantity of leisure demanded, and (2C/WU) C12 >0
if leisure is a normal good,
The reservation hours of work function may be derived by differentiating
equation (1) with respect to the wage and evaluating the derivative at the
reservation wage (WR).
(2) hR =_Gl(WR,
U°) + H —
whereU° is the level of utility achieved if the individual does not work.
To obtain the effect of a change in the money cost of work on reser-
vation hours, differentiate equation (2) with respect to N holding utility
constant at U°. This differentiation yields
(3) dhR dWR
dM 11dM
The term is the change in the reservation wage for a given change in
the money cost of labor market entry. As should be intuitively obvious, an
increase in the cost of entry will raise the reservation wage; that is,
1
>0.The remaining term, —C11,
is the substitution effect of a wage
'Formally, this result may be derived by differentiating the expendi-
ture function simultaneously with respect to W and M, and solving for
dWR 0
at (WR, U ).7
change on the quantity of labor supplied. It is also necessarily greater
than zero. Reservation hours, therefore, rise with Increases in the
money costs ofwork.1
The effect of an increase in time cost of market entry on reserva-
tion hours is, on the other hand, theroetically ambiguous in sign. To
see this, differentiate equation (2) with respect to tholdingutility
constant at U° to obtain
dhR dWR
(4)
The product of the first two terms is the change in the quantity of leisure
demanded at the reservation wage. As with money costs, an increase in time
costs increases the reservation wage. The higher reservation wage reduces
the quantity of leisure demanded at the reservation wage. However, the total
quantity of time available for work or leisure declines by an amount equal to
the increase in time cost of market entry. The change in reservation hours
depends upon the relative strengths of these two opposing effects.2
interesting implication of equation (3) is that if one had data
on money costs and could estimate reservation hours of work, one could use
this information to estimate the parameters of the compensated labor supply
function.
2Further expansion of equation (4) yieldsan interesting though,
perhaps, less intuitive expression. Using the expenditure function, the
w
effect of time cost on the reservation wage can be solved for as .Sub-




The product of the first two terms is the elasticity of the compensated
labor supply function evaluated at the reservation wage—hours combination.
Thus, the effect of time costs on reservation hours may be said to depend
on whether the compensated labor supply function evaluated at the reserva-
tion wage is greater or less than unity.8
Finally, to obtain the effect of nonwage income on reservation hours
differentiate equation (3) with respect to Y, allowing utility to vary.
Differentiation yields
dhR 1 dWR dU0l =[i
1 + G12
Assuming leisure is a normal good, an increase in nonwage income will
dWR
raise the reservation wage; hence is positive. Obviously since an
income in nonwage income raises the utility achieved by not working,
0
is also positive. However, under the assumption that leisure is a
normal good G11 and are opposite in sign. Thus, in general, the effect
of nonwage income on reservation hours is ambiguous.
This effect, however, can be signed in at least one interesting
case; when the uncompensated labor supply function is backward bending
in the neighborhood of the reservation wage. If it is, an increase in
nonwage income will raise reservation hours. To derive this result, diff-
erentiate the expenditure function with respect to Y holding utility constant
to obtain an expression for the change in the reservation wage for a given




'As stated earlier, this expression is positive if leisure is a
normal good. Note that the product of the first two terms inside the
bracket is actually a ratio of marginal utilities evaluated at two points
along an indifference curve in income—leisure space. If leisure is a normal
good then the ratio is greater than unity. This proposition is easily proven
by evaluating the utility compensated effect of a wage change on the marginal
utility of income.9
Substituting equation (6) into (5) and rearranging terms yields
=- [Gii+ hRG12 + G2GiJ -
= +h fl- c2J
Thesum of the first two terms inside the brackets is the slope of the
uncompensated labor supply function evaluated at the reservation wage.
All other terms have been defined earlier and are positive in sign.
Assuming an upward rising labor supply function, the analysis suggests
a rather convenient characterization of the hours of work and labor force
participation decisions. Define an augmented labor supply functionas
the actual labor supply function extrapolated back to thewage axis. This
augmented labor supply function can be written as
(8) h* =H(W,Y-N+W(H-T))
The reservation hours function is
(9) hRF(M,T,Y)
Using equations (8 )and(9 )andassuming an upward rising labor supply
function, the labor force participation decision may be cast in terms of a
comparison between h* and hR. If h exceeds hR the individual will choose
to work and her observed hours of work (h) will equal h .IfhR exceeds h*
the individual will choose not to work and observed hours of work will
equal zero.1
1This formulation of theparticipation decision is obviously equivalent
to using the more conventional market Wage—reservationwage characterization.
The above formulation is used because it leadsnaturally to a specification
of the econometric model that facilitates comparisons withearly work.10
III. ESTIMATION
To estimate labor supply functions when there are costs of labor force
participation, one of two empirical strategies may be followd If information
on the time and money costs of labor market entry incurred by participants
is available, then these costs can be used to estimate the structural
parameters of not only the labor supply function but also of costs of work
functions. On the other hand if information on the time and money costs
of work is not available, then one can only obtain estimates of a quasi—
reduced form labor supply function. The quasi—reduced form estimates will
reflect not only the parameters of the individual's utility function but
also the effects of variations in the cost of work. In this section, I
discuss estimation when time and money costs cannot be directly observed
on the data.'
In order to estimate the parameters of the model, it is necessary to
specify the relevant equations and the underlying stochastic structure.
Following the analysis of Section II, two functions characterize the labor
supply decision: an augmented hours of work function and a reservation hours
function.
The augmented hours equation is assumed to take the followingform
for the ith individual:
(10)h =yO+ylN(W.)+y2YH+y3C+y4E.+y5A+oEylN(w)+y'z,+c
'Estimation of the complete set of structural parameters when the
costs of work are available is discussed in Cogan (1977).11
where N(W1) is the natural logarithm of the wife's hourly wage, E is her
years of education, C is the number of preschool children (age 0—5) in the
home, is the husband's income, and A. is the wife's age. The theoret-
ical and empirical relevance of each of these variables, in the absence of
costs of work, is well known.
The reservation hours equation assumes the form
(11) hR =0+ + 2C. + 3E. + 4A. + c 'Z1 +
i .1 1 1 1
Althoughone may have intuitive feelings about the effects of each of
these variables on reservation hours, the theory developed in the preceding
section offers little insight into their expected effects.
The dependent variable is annual hours of work in 1966. This choice
requires some discussion. Ideally, we would like to use a measure of labor
supply whose dimension is the same as the period of time over which the
fixed costs are incurred. That is, if daily fixed costs, such as transpor-
tation costs to and from work, are important, then the appropriate measure
of labor supply would be hours of work per day. Unfortunately, existing
micro data files do not contain information on daily hours of work.
Together ezluations (10) and (11) imply a reservation wage equation of
the form
(12) WR. =60+61H.+ 62C. + 63E. + 64A. + u2
1 1 1
where
_____ 1 = and =
-— (8
— for i=1,412
The specification of the wage offer equation is
(13) N(W)a0+a1E1+ci2X.+a3U.+c4N+ct5WE+c6A+c2 Ea'Z0 +c2
1 1 i
where E is the level of education completed by the wife, X is her prior
labor market experienceU is a dummy variable which assumes a value of one
if the woman resides in an urban area, and N and WE are two regions of the
country dummies, north and west, respectively.
The vector of disturbances (c0,c1,c2) is assumed to be normally dis-
tributed with mean vector zero and constant covariance matrix Q.
Clearly, if the endogenous variables, h*, hR. and W, could be observed
for all individuals, then the parameters ot equations (1O)—(13) could be
estimated with two— or three—stage least squares. Unfortunately, these
variables are not observed for all individuals. Reservation hours
cannot be observed for individual in the data, and h* and wage offers
cannot be observed for nonworkers. Without these data,an alternative
statistical approach, such as maximum likelihood isrequired to estimate
the parameters.
To form the likelihood function it is necessary to relate the values
of the hypothetical dependent variables to their empirical counterparts,
and describe the process by which these observable counterparts are
generated in terms of the underlying stochastic elements. Assuming an
upward rising supply function, a woman will be observed to be working if
(14) h1 >hR
1Work by Heckman and Willis (1977) casts serious doubt on whether it
is appropriate to regard prior labor market experience as exogenous to the
current wage offer. Also, more recent work by Reckman (1980) suggests that
prior experience may also belong in the structural labor supply function.13
Substituting the market wage offer equation into the hours of work function,
the participation decision may be written as
(15) y1a'Z0 + (y' — >— (c+ y1c2)




u ''N(0,o + + y2a2 — — 211012+ 211002)
The likelihood of observing a nonparticipant is simply
(17) Prob[I <uj=
J_=e_1#'2(T)2 dT
Forobservations on workers we know that reservation hours are less than
the solution to the augmented hours, that is,
(18) h*Z1 >
Hence,the appropriate density measure for observations hours and wages








where f(s) is the trivariate normal density function. Using equations (17)
and (19), the likelihood of the data consisting (say) of T observations, S
of them on nonworking women, is14
SI Th.—
(20) L= J1—P JJj'
f(h—1cx'Z0—y'Z1 W—c'Z0c1)dc1
i=1 Ui=S+1_oo 1 1 11
Thecomputational burden of optimizing the likelihood function may be
reduced by replacing the trivarlate normal density function with the product
of the bivariate conditional normal and unit normal marginal densities.
This permits factoring the right—most term in equation 20 into a simple
univariate probit and bivariate normal density)
To estimate the parameters of the model, a multi—step procedure was
used. First, consistent estimates of the parameters of the wage equation
were obtained with Beckman's (1976) censored sample regression procedure.
The likelihood function, conditional upon these estimated values,2 was
then optimized. This two—step procedure yields consistent estimates of
the parameters, but incorrect asymptotic standard errors. To obtain
asymptotically efficient standard errors, these parameter estimates were
used as initial values in a one—step Newton—Raphson iteration on the
likelihood function in equation (20).
owe this point to Tom MaCurdy and an anonymous referee
2The likelihood function conditional upon estimated values of
the wage equation parameters collapses to one which is identical to that
proposed by Nelson (1974) and Olsen (1975) for models with unobserved
stochastic censoring thresholds.15
IV.EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Thedata used for the empirical analysiswere taken from the 1967
National Longitudinal (Parnes) Survey of Mature Women age 30—34 in 1966.
The sample selected contained 898 wives who worked at some time during 1966
and 939 who did not. Details of the data selection process and means and
variances of the variables used in this study are provided in the Appendix.
Estimates of the market wage function are reported in Table 1. For
comparative purposes, ordinary least—squares estimates of the wage offer
equation are also presented. The coefficients on education, experience,'
and urban are all statistically significant. The coefficient on education
should be interpreted as the effect of completing an additional year of
schooling rather than spending that year out of the labor force. Likewise,
the experience coefficient represents the effect of spending at least six
months in the labor force during a given year relative to spending that time
out of the labor force. The small size of the age coefficient indicates
little, if any, effect of either wage depreciation resulting from spending
time out of the labor force or variations in the quality of schooling over
time. Using a two—standard—deviation confidence ban (a 95% confidence
interval), our results indicate that the age effect lies between plus and
minus 1%.
Comparing these ordinary least—squares estimates with the "selectivity
bias—free" estimates provides some evidence of the effect of the selectivity
bias on individual parameter estimates. The major bias appears to be in the
estimate of the intercept term, which accounts for the entire difference
'Experience is defined as the number ofyears since completion of
school to 1966 in which the woman worked at least six months of the year.16
Table 1
Married Women's Wage Offer Equations
Instrumental Variables Ordinary Least Squares
Variable CoefficientStandard ErrorCoefficient Standard Error
Intercept —.9556 .3273 —.8388 .1980
Education .0826 .0116 .0806 .0077
Experience .0298 .0694 .0230 .0030
Age .0008 .0089 .0022 .0210
North .0192 .0637 .0233 .0430
West .0786 .0726 .0801 .0550






Full sample 1.65 1.80
*Given the assumed form of the wage offer equation, wages are log normally
distributed and the mean wage offer is calculated by
âZ +—a2 — 022 w= e17
conditional and unconditional average wages at the sample means. The dif-
ference in the estimate of the effect of prior labor market experience,
though small in absolute magnitude, is large relative to the size of the
coefficient (23%). Likewise for the urban dummy (40%). It is encouraging
to find that the selectivity bias has little effect on the education
coefficient. Since the coefficients on age, north, and west have such
relatively large standard errors, little can be concluded about the impact
of the sample selection bias on these estimated parameters.
Table 2 presents estimates of the parameters of the hours of work and
reservation hours functions. The asymptotic standard errors of the esti-
mated parameters are given in parentheses.
The estimates presented in Table 2 conform, at least qualitatively, to
those obtained in previous empirical studies of this demographicgroup (see,
for instance, Heckman, 1974; Cogan, 1975; Schultz, 1975) and thus indicate
that incorporation of time and money costs of entry do not alter the quali-
tative nature of the estimated labor supply parameters. An increase in the
wife's wage increasannua1 hours of work among workingwomen, though its
effect is much smaller than those found in earlier studies of Heckman (1974) and
Schultz (1975). The wife's education, her husband's income, and the
number of preschool children in the home all exert a negative influence on
her annual hours. Finally, there appears to be no life—cycle or cohort
variations in hours worked among working women in the age range of the
sample.
In the reservation hours equation, both preschool children and the
wife's age significantly raise the minimum number of hours a woman is
willing to supply to the labor market. Increases in the husband's earnings
also tend to increase the minimum number of hours but its effect is small18
Table 2
Entry Cost Model Parameter Estimates
Hours of Reservation
Work Function hours Function
Coefficient Coefficient
(asymptotic (asymptotic
Variable standard error) standard error)
Constant 2158.69 746.2
(510.43) (361.82)
Log wife's wage 1210.91
(185.49)
Wife's education —91.54 —23.77
(18.36) (21.35)
Number of children —120.41 109.74
0—6 years old (52.89) (64.08)
Husband's earnings —22.425 11.09
($1,000) (9.07) (10.35)







and not statistically significant. Increases in the wife's level of educa-
tion, on the other hand, reduce minimum hours, though its effect is also
not significant.
The estimated mean reservation hours is large, for both working and
nonworking women in the sample, indicating that time and money costs of
labor market entry are of prime importance in affecting a married woman's
labor supply decisions. For example, a 10% increase in the wage offer
facing the average nonworking woman in the sample would not induce her to
enter the labor market. However, a 15% increase would and she would supply
1,327 hours a year at this new wage. If there were an additional increase
of 15% in her wage offer, her hours of work would increase by only an
additional 180 per year.
The estimated parameters may be used to solve for the compensating
variation measure of the costs of participation. In order to obtain this
measure, it is necessary to derive the form of the compensated labor supply
function from the assumed form of the uncompensated function. The uncompen—
sated labor supply function (equation (10)) may be written succinctly as
(21) hi =y'Z.+ y1N(W.) +
where Z is the vector of other included right—hand—side variables. Using
the Slutsky decomposition, we may write the slope of a compensated labor




The general form of the compensated function may be obtained from
equation (22) easily. Equation (22) is a first—order linear differential






where w is the intercept of the labor supply function extrapolated down to
zero hours of work and c is an arbitrary constant. The particular solutionat
the reservation wage—hours p0-mtcan be obtained with numerical methods.
Given the form of the compensated laborsupply function, I have
computed estimates of the annual fixed costs of work forthe average
working and nonworking women separately. Theseestimates are presented
in Table 3 along with estimates of howthese costs change with the number
of preschool age children andyears of education for the average woman
in the data. Unfortunately, I have beenunable to compute the standard
errors of these estimates. Caution, therefore, shouldbe exercised
before attaching too much weight to theirimportance.
Table 3
Annual Costs of Work
Workers $907.74
Nonworkers $1,080.97





aThe effectsare evaluated at the
sample means.21
The estimates of the annual fixed costs are large, though not unreason-
ably so. For working women, this annual participation cost expressed as a
percentage of the average annual earnings of working women is 28.3%. As
expected, the estimated cost facing nonworkers exceeds that facing workers,
with the differential being $113.23. The estimated effect of an additional
preschool—age child, evaluated at the sample means, is of the expected sign
and quite large. At the sample means the difference in the number of pre-
school children accounts for 80 percent of the difference in the fixed costs
of working between working and nonworking women, .Educationhas a positive
effect on the annual costs of participation. An additional year of education
increases the annual costs of work by over $100. Michael (1973) and others
have argued that education raises nonmarket production. If so, then one
might expect that more educated women would have better allocative skills,
and hence lower costs of entry. However, there are other factors which would
tend to produce a positive relationship between education and the costs of
participation. More highly educated women live in higher income households
which tend to locate further from central business districts than low—income
households (see Kain, 1962 and Muth, 1969).Thus transportation costs would
be higher for more educated women. Also, more highly educated women attach
a higher value to their nonmarket time, and hence place a higher value on a
given amount of time lost in entering the market.
The assumed form of the labor supply function, in particular, hours
as a linear function of log wages is one commonly used to estimate labor
supply functions of married women. It would be of interest
to know whether allowing for a discontinuity in the market supply function
results in parameter estimates that differ from those of this conventional
formulation. To aid in characterizing the restrictions implied by the22
conventional model, return for the moment to the empirical model (equations
(10) —(12)).Under the assumption of no costs of participation, reserva-
tion hours (hR) are identically zero for all observations. Thus, equation
(11) is eliminated from the model and the restricted model becomes
(24) K. =
10+ y1N(W) + 2H + 13C3 + y4E. + y5A. +
i 1 1
(25) N(W.) =a+ a E. + a X. + a U + a A. + a WE. + a N. + c
1 0ii2i31 4i 516i 2.1
Equation (24) may be expressed in a slightly different form to yield
the wage at which the woman would be willing to supply a given amount of
labor. This form of the labor supply function, termed the shadow wage
function, Is given by
i '2 2 13 14 0j
(26) N(W )=—+—h. -—Y -—C.——E.—----A.-—— sy
1 H. i i i
Equations(25)and (26) characterize the conventional model.
Thismodel was first proposed byHeckman (1974a), Without detracting from
Heckman'scontribution, note that it imposes two restrictions relative to
amodel that allows for costs of entry. First, itimposesthe restriction
ofcontinuity in the supply function for all hours. Second, it imposes a
proportionality relationship between the parameters of the labor supply
and reservation—wage equations. The reservation—wage equation is defined
as the shadow—wage equation (25) at zero hours of work. Each parameter
is proportional to the corresponding parameter in the hours of work equation
with the factor of proportionality being the slope of the labor supply function.1
1Itshould be pointed out that this restriction is relaxed by Heckman
in the generalized version of the model which he proposes in his l974b paper.23
If entry costs are important in the data, one would expect the esti—
mates of the conventionalmodel to systematically exceed in absolute value
those of the entry cost model. To see this, consider the graph in Figure 3.
In this graph, hT represents the "true" labor supply function when there are
costs of participation. The existence of fixed costs is reflected by the
discontinuity at the reservation wage. A constraint of zero costs of entry
in the model implies a constraint of continuity in the labor supply func-
tion, i.e., that the height of the labor supply function at its origin (the
shadow price of time as full—time leisure) equals the reservation wage.
Imposing this constraint on data which has at least some nonworkers will
result in an estimated labor supply function that looks like hE and the
effect of the wage on hours of work will be overstated. This result will,





h Hours of Work
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Figure 324
To determine whether the two models lead to important differences in
parameter estimates, Heckman's (1974) maximum likelihood procedure was
applied to the data to estimate the parameters of the conventional model.
This estimate along with those of the entry cost model are provided in
Table 4. Differences in estimated parameters are both systematic and large.
Table 4






































aStandard errors are given in parentheses.
'In Figure 3, the intercept of the estimated labor supply function
(the estimated reservation wage), is drawnso that it equals the true
reservationwage (WR). In reality, it is not clear whether the conventional
model will lead to an over or under estimate of the reservation wage if
both time and money costs are present.25
The estimated wage coefficient is almost three times as large in the
converitionalinodel, the education coefficient twice as large, the husband's
earnings coefficient four times as large, the children coefficientfive
times as large, and the age coefficient one hundred times as large.
To further assess the comparability of the two models, some 'additional
statistics were computed. Both the conventional model and the entry cost
model jointly estimate the probability of working and hours of work among
the workers. The sample labor force participation rate is .491. The
estimated mean probability of working with our proposed procedure is .494, while
that of the conventional model is .52, Using a 50 percent rule, the propor-
tion of successful predictions of labor force status with the fixed cost
model is .718; with the conventional model it is slightly higher, .725.
Thus, the two approaches appear to predict the work—not work decision
equally well.
To compare the relative accuracy of the two models in predicting hours
of work, the sum of squared deviations of actual hours of work from pre-
dicted hours of work for the subsample of labor force participants was
computed. The sum of squared deviations for the conventionalmodel is four
times as large as that for the entry cost model.
To make a final assessment on the comparability of the
two models, consider the graph in Figure 4 of the labor supply functions
estimated with the two models. Let W be the wage at which the labor supply
functions estimated from the two models intersect one another. If nonzero
reservation hours are important in the data, the conventional model would be
expected to underpredict hours of work among the workers with wages below
W relative to the entry cost model. The reverse should be true for workers









Figure4. Average married women's estimated labor
supply functions
for the entry cost is +70.6; for the conventional model, it is +1293.3.
For wages above ,theentry cost yields a mean residual of —729.8, and
for the conventional model it is —1379.6.
These comparisons indicate that the conventional model is
misspecified relative to the entry cost model. It is tempting to conclude
that the misspecification arises because fixed costs of labor market
entry are ignored. However, this is not necessarily correct. It might
be that fixed costs of entry are unimportant in generating observations
on hours of work and that labor supply functions are nonlinear; being
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relatively flat at low wages and relatively steep at high wages.
If so, allowing for a discontinuity might provide a good approximation
to the relatively flat portion of the supply function. Hence, it might
give the appearance of the importance of fixed costs of entry when, in
fact, these costs are unimportant. The point is that without observable
data on fixed costs, evidence of their effects can only be obtained
indirectly and, as a consequence, results of tests for their existence
may depend crucially on the assumed functional form of the labor supply
equation. However, regardless of whether or not fixed costs are important
in generating the data, the conventionally used labor supply function for
married women is misspecified. It is likely that the rather large own—
wage elasticities estimated for these women reported in earlier studies
is a direct result of this misspecification.28
V. CONCLUSIONS
The major conclusion drawn from the analysis presented in
this paper is that costs of labor force participation, measured both
in terms of their estimated dollar amount and their estimated effects on
labor supply behavior, appear to be important, at least in the demographic
group analyzed here. For the average woman in the data the costs of
work amount to approximately 28 percent of annual earnings. These
costs impart a discontinuity in the average woman's labor function of
almost 1300 hours per year, which is larger than half—time work. Also,
differences in the number of preschool—age children in the home appear
to be a major factor contributing to these costs and account for virtually
all the difference between the costs of work facing working and nonworking
women. From the comparisons of estimators, there is evidence that the
conventionally used empirical model of labor supply which ignores fixed
costs leads to substantial overestimates of the true labor supply parameters.
These conclusions must be qualified somewhat. Estimation of the costs
of work requires extrapolation of the compensated labor supply function
from the level of the discontinuity to the origin. In this region there
are relatively few observations. It is also not clear how sensitive the
costs estimates are to the function form chosen. Serious consideration
should be given to these issues before attaching too much weight to the
estimates of the annual costs of work. Also, the model assumes that women
can freely choose and vary their hours of work. Yet, casual empiricism
suggests that there may be minimum hours of work constraints imposed by
employers for many types of jobs. The large constant term in the
reservation hours function may primarily reflect these constraints rather
than the effects of fixed costs of work in the supply side.29
APPENDIX
Thedata used for the empirical analysis was taken from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Nature Women. The NLS data file consists of five
annual surveys of a multi—stage probability sample of women aged 30—44 in
1966. In this study only the information contained in the first interview
(1967) was used. The basic sample drawn from the 1967 survey consisted of
approximately 2700 observations on white households in which both the
husband and wife were present. Given the problems of separating reported
income into the return to labor and capital for individuals who are self—
employed or owned a farm, households in which either spouse reported being
self—employed were dropped from this basic sample. After these exclusions
about 2300 observations remained. Further exclusions (360 observations)
were made because of missing or incomplete information on the core variables
of this study, such as income, age, education, etc. Finally, an additional
110 observations on households in which the husband performed no market in
1966 were dropped from the sample.
The remaining sample used for the empirical analysis consisted of 1829
households. Of these, 898 contained wives who worked at some time during
1966 and 931 who did not. Table A.1 provides the means and variances of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Urban —dummyvariable which assumes a value of one if the household
resided in a city of over 250,000 in 1967.
North —dummyvariable which assumes a value of one if the household
resides in the Northeast or North central states as defined by the Census.
West —dummyvariable which assumes a value of one if the household
resides in the western states as defined by the Census.
Experience —numberof years up to 1966 since marriage that the woman
worked at least six months.
Wife's education —numberof years of education completed by the wife.
Wife's wage rate —calculatedby dividing earnings in 1966 by annual
hours of work in 1966.
Wife's hours of work —weeksworked in 1966 multiplied by usual number
of hours worked per week.32
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